Published in:University of Milan Bicocca Department of Economics, Management and Statistics Working Paper ; No. 270
Extent:
1 Online-Ressource (45 p)
Language:
English
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2405833
Identifier:
Origination:
Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 7, 2014 erstellt
Description:
This paper compares the ability to select the efficient policy of a parliamentary and a presidential constitutional setup. In order to do it we build a dynamic theoretical model with asymmetric information that succeeds in addressing both the politicians accountability and the competence dimensions. The main di¤erence between the two institutional frameworks is the presence of the con fidence vote in the parliamentary system that may cause elections before the natural end of the legislature. The equilibrium predictions suggest that, exactly because of the different incentives created by the con fidence vote, the parliamentary system has a higher probability of selecting the efficient policy the higher is the quality of politicians that are member of the legislative body