Published in:University of Milan Bicocca Department of Economics, Management and Statistics Working Paper ; No. 232
Extent:
1 Online-Ressource (21 p)
Language:
English
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2291268
Identifier:
Origination:
Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments September 2012 erstellt
Description:
Despite a series of official agreements aimed at strengthening Bank-Fund cooperation, it is widely believed that coordination between the two organizations often falls short of what should be rationally expected. In this paper we present a theoretical model which, focusing on the quality of information transmission between the IMF and the WB, analyzes the impact of different governance structures on the degree of Bank-Fund cooperation. We compare the performance of a "delegation-scheme" with that of a "centralization-scheme." A centralized structure better addresses the necessity of coordinating policy actions but greater consistency between the Bank and the Fund policy actions will be achieved at the expenses of a less satisfactory adaptation to "local conditions." When the need for coordination is relevant, as it is in general the case for the Bank and the Fund operations, we find that a centralized governance structure allows to achieve a level of overall payoff greater than those of a decentralized one