Published in:Riksbank Research Paper Series ; No. 97
Extent:
1 Online-Ressource (23 p)
Language:
English
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2285364
Identifier:
Origination:
Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 22, 2013 erstellt
Description:
We analyze a bargaining model where there is a long-term relationship between a seller and a buyer and there is bargaining over a sequence of surpluses that arrives at fixed points in time. Markov Perfect Equilibria are analyzed and equilibrium payoffs characterized. The transfers between the players can be described as a first-order system of difference equations. Payoffs depend on both current and future surpluses. Future surpluses are important partly because the risk of separation leads to the loss of surplus today and in the future and partly because delay without separation can last into future periods. We also find conditions for existence and uniqueness of equilibria with immediate agreement