Published in:CESifo Working Paper Series ; No. 4114
Extent:
1 Online-Ressource (46 p)
Language:
English
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2221851
Identifier:
Origination:
Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments February 21, 2013 erstellt
Description:
This study explains the observed repeated personal interactions between lobbyists and policymakers. The analysis uses a dynamic model of commercial lobbying in which citizens may hire lobbyists to present policy proposals on their behalf to policymakers. It is shown that repeated interactions with lobbyists simplify a policymaker's information problem in the presence of unverifiable information provision and allow a solution to their contracting problem. The welfare implications of these interactions depend on whether the policymakers' information or contracting problem predominates. Further, the policymaker's information problem and financial contributions may actually improve social welfare in comparison to the full information outcome