Published in:Chicago Booth Research Paper ; No. 13-04
Extent:
1 Online-Ressource (59 p)
Language:
English
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2017802
Identifier:
Origination:
Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments August 14, 2012 erstellt
Description:
This paper presents a model of intellectual property contracts. We explain why many intellectual property contracts are contingent on eventual production or success, even without moral hazard on the part of risk-averse sellers. The explanation is based on differences of opinion between buyers and sellers, and reputation building through multiple transactions. Our model predicts that more reputable sellers will be offered a very different mix of cash and contingency payments than inexperienced sellers. We also discuss the probability of sales as a function of seller and product characteristics. The theoretical model is tested on a data base of screenplay contracts