Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 30, 2012 erstellt
Description:
Health care provision in the public sector is increasingly oriented towards a reduction of vertical integration through fairly heterogeneous methods as concerns the contractual rules and the actors that are allowed to compete. In this paper we model the choice of a benevolent regulator that wants to maximise welfare in a context where costs cannot be observed and quality cannot be verifi ed. It can choose between di fferent types of providers (private, non-pro t and public providers) and three frameworks (no competition, monopoly franchise and spatial competition). We show that in general the best option depends on consumers' evaluation of quality, providers' altruism and their productivity diff erential. Although competition for the market may allow to maximise the rent extracted, spatial competition should be preferred if consumers care for quality. Mixed markets (where two di erent types of providers compete) are always dominated by pure forms