• Media type: E-Book
  • Title: On Price Competition with Market Share Delegation Contracts
  • Contributor: Kopel, Michael [Author]; Lambertini, Luca [Other]
  • imprint: [S.l.]: SSRN, [2012]
  • Published in: Quaderni DSE Working Paper ; No. 806
  • Extent: 1 Online-Ressource (11 p)
  • Language: English
  • DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1988113
  • Identifier:
  • Origination:
  • Footnote: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments January 8, 2012 erstellt
  • Description: We identify a mistake in the specification of the demand system used in the strategic delegation model based on market shares by Jansen et al. (2007), whereby the price remains above marginal cost when goods are homogeneous. After amending this aspect, we perform a profit comparison with the alternative delegation scheme à la Fershtman and Judd (1987)
  • Access State: Open Access