Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments August 25, 2010 erstellt
Description:
The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (RPD) is a metaphor for the difficulties of achieving cooperation in social life. We present results from an agent-based model (ABM) of the RPD in which agents interact in a “market,” equivalent to interactions within the standard RPD, within networks, where agents acquire information or select with whom to interact, or within hierarchies that enforce cooperation by the threat of third party punishment. Organizations affect the evolution of cooperation in significant ways. In relatively nice worlds, agents join network, insulating themselves against often devastating defections of nasty players. In nasty worlds, nice agents enter hierarchies and increase or sustain their share of the population. In moderate worlds, contingent strategies typically decline as a share of the population. Organizations improve the welfare of all agents, but only in relatively nice worlds. We find the benefits of civil society are contingent on the population in which it emerges