• Media type: E-Book
  • Title: Deception and False Expectations
  • Contributor: Koning, Lukas [Author]; Steinel, Wolfgang [Other]; van Beest, Ilja [Other]; van Dijk, Eric [Other]
  • imprint: [S.l.]: SSRN, [2011]
  • Published in: IACM 24th Annual Conference Paper
  • Extent: 1 Online-Ressource (1 p)
  • Language: English
  • DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1872904
  • Identifier:
  • Origination:
  • Footnote: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments 2011 erstellt
  • Description: Deception is a common bargaining tactic that has also often been described as a form of unethical behavior. One reason why deception could be considered unethical is that it may evoke false expectations in others. In the current article we investigated false expectations that may be raised by using deception in an ultimatum bargaining setting. In particular, we investigated whether lying about your own outcomes is evaluated differently than lying about the outcomes of another party. In two experiments, we demonstrated that people judge a lying opponent less harshly when he or she lied about his own outcomes instead of the outcomes of another party. In addition, in our third experiment we demonstrate that people prefer are more likely to lie about their own outcomes than about those of another party
  • Access State: Open Access