Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 2002 erstellt
Description:
The purpose of this paper is to identify and analyze the determinants and consequences of bailing out states, in particular, those observed in Mexico. This work suggests that the explicit generalized bailout carried out by the federal government in Mexico in 1995 created a moral hazard problem. Another result of the analysis is that the existing institutional-legal framework is not adequate, since it provides incentives for states to borrow and for banks to lend without evaluating the risk of the project. Likewise, the importance of the state is a major determinant in providing bailout transfers. Also, the more fiscal need a state government has when the state government is incapable of adjusting its expenditure, the more likely the state to get an extraordinary transfer during the period of study. On the other hand, political variables are not an important determinant of a bailout, except, perhaps, when there are state elections. It is also shown that excessive indebtedness of local states may have equity implications as well: bailouts tend to be highly regressive, as the poorer—and less indebted—states receive much less in extraordinary resources