• Media type: E-Book
  • Title: Territorial Exclusivity in Franchisee Systems
  • Contributor: Vázquez, Luis [Author]; Carvalho, Ana Branca [Other]
  • imprint: [S.l.]: SSRN, [2010]
  • Extent: 1 Online-Ressource (17 p)
  • Language: English
  • DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1630427
  • Identifier:
  • Origination:
  • Footnote: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 25, 2010 erstellt
  • Description: This article shows that the higher the problems of hold-up and free-riding in franchise systems, the higher the probability that the franchisor will provide franchisees with territorial exclusivity. It therefore appears that territorial exclusivity is an assurance from a franchisor that the return on the sunk investments of a franchisee will not be subsequently held-up. Moreover, it appears that territorial exclusivity alleviates free-riding problem by making the franchisees local monopolists for the brand in question, which increases the probability that they will receive most of the benefits generated by their service provision
  • Access State: Open Access