Published in:MPI Collective Goods Preprint ; No. 2010/23
Extent:
1 Online-Ressource (29 p)
Language:
English
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.1617196
Identifier:
Origination:
Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 1, 2010 erstellt
Description:
In this paper we investigate the role of judicial control of lobbying activities in an endogenous policy framework, focusing on two dimensions of quality of the judiciary, namely efficiency and integrity. We present a multi-layer lobbying model where a self-interested group is allowed to influence a public decision maker – and possibly the judicial authority itself, which performs an anti-corruption task – with the payment of illegal contributions, and provide general conditions for the existence of a zero-contribution equilibrium. Furthermore, we study how sensitive the main findings are to different institutional arrangements as to judicial independence