Published in:Paolo Baffi Centre Research Paper ; No. 2009-63
Extent:
1 Online-Ressource (17 p)
Language:
English
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.1520928
Identifier:
Origination:
Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 2009 erstellt
Description:
In this paper, we analyze the risk taking behavior of banks in emerging economies, in a context of international bank competition. In the spirit of Vives (2002 and 2006) who has developed the notion of "external market discipline", our paper introduces a new channel through which depositors can exercise pressure to control risk taking. They can reallocate their savings away from their home country to a more protective system of a developed economy. In such a frame-work, we show that there is no univoque relationship between the information disclosure of risk management and excessive risk taking. This relationship depends on the degree of financial openness of the emergent country, which ultimately defines how effective the market discipline is. Furthermore, we analyze the risk taking choice of banks in emergent economies in presence of deposit insurance. We find no monotone relationship between the likeliness of excessive risk taking of banks in the emerging country and the level of deposit insurance