You can manage bookmarks using lists, please log in to your user account for this.
Media type:
E-Book
Title:
Exploring the Schelling Conjecture in Reverse
:
‘International Constraints’ and Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments August, 20 2009 erstellt
Description:
Students of bargaining have long focused on the dual nature of international negotiations, which take place both internationally and domestically. The prevailing wisdom is that under certain conditions political leaders can use domestic constraints to get a better deal at the negotiating table. In this paper, I argue that under certain conditions leaders have an incentive to use ‘international constraints' to pressure their domestic constituents into accepting a particular policy. I apply this argument to the Serbian and Croatian cases of western pressure for cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (Hague Tribunal)