• Media type: E-Book
  • Title: Stakeholder Syndrome : Does Stakeholderism Derail Effective Protections for Weaker Constituencies?
  • Contributor: Gatti, Matteo [Author]; Ondersma, Chrystin D. [Author]
  • Published: [S.l.]: SSRN, [2021]
  • Published in: Rutgers Law School Research Paper No
  • Extent: 1 Online-Ressource (50 p)
  • Language: English
  • DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3793732
  • Identifier:
  • Origination:
  • Footnote: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments February 26, 2021 erstellt
  • Description: We evaluate stakeholderism in the context of one constituency—workers—by exploring a few key known contributors to workers’ economic disadvantage: concentration and monopsony in labor markets, weak collective action protections for workers, a declining minimum wage, and the harsh reality of outsourced and gig work. After reviewing specific policy proposals in those areas, which we believe have the capacity to shift power and resources to workers, we then evaluate whether stakeholderism can help workers in any way, either by offering a feasible substitute to these policies or by providing a fertile landscape for worker advancement. Because available evidence suggests that corporations will seek to undermine any proposal that meaningfully shifts power and resources to workers, it is unlikely stakeholderism could provide equivalent protections that can actually improve workers’ position; assuming it could, its implementation would be no more feasible than direct regulation. Neither do we believe that stakeholderism can provide a fertile landscape for direct regulation, because corporations are likely to use stakeholderism as a pretext to wield greater political power and to shape the debate in their own favor, thus interfering with direct regulation. Ultimately, given the risks of allowing managers and directors wield stakeholderism in their own interests, political capital should be spent on achieving direct regulation rather than on a stakeholderist corporate governance reform
  • Access State: Open Access