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Zapechelnyuk, Andy [Author]

On the Equivalence of Information Design by Uninformed and Informed Principals

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  • Media type: E-Book
  • Title: On the Equivalence of Information Design by Uninformed and Informed Principals
  • Contributor: Zapechelnyuk, Andy [Author]
  • Published: [S.l.]: SSRN, [2022]
  • Extent: 1 Online-Ressource (22 p)
  • Language: English
  • DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4017510
  • Identifier:
  • Keywords: Information design ; Bayesian persuasion ; informed principal ; implementation ; sequential equilibrium
  • Origination:
  • Footnote: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments January 25, 2022 erstellt
  • Description: We compare information design, or Bayesian persuasion, by uninformed and informed principals. We show that, under the assumptions of monotone preferences of the principal and nondegenerate information structures, a Pareto undominated outcome is implementable by the uninformed principal if and only if it is implementable by the informed principal
  • Access State: Open Access