• Media type: E-Book
  • Title: Disagreement Aversion
  • Contributor: Bommier, Antoine [Author]; Fabre, Adrien [Author]; Goussebaïle, Arnaud [Author]; Heyen, Daniel [Author]
  • Published: [S.l.]: SSRN, [2022]
  • Extent: 1 Online-Ressource (44 p)
  • Language: English
  • DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3964182
  • Identifier:
  • Origination:
  • Footnote: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 15, 2021 erstellt
  • Description: Experts often disagree. A decision-maker may be averse to such expert disagreement. Existing models of aversion to expert disagreement rest on ambiguity-averse preferences adopting a unanimity principle: If all experts consider one choice better than another, so should the decision-maker. Such unanimity among experts, however, can be spurious, masking substantial disagreement on the underlying reasons. We introduce a novel notion of disagreement aversion to distinguish spurious from genuine unanimity and develop a model that can capture disagreement aversion in our sense. The central element of our model is the cautious aggregation of experts’ beliefs
  • Access State: Open Access