Description:
Part I Kantian Foundations -- 1 What Is Promising About a Radical Kantian Animal Ethic -- 1.1 Kantianism for Animals -- 1.2 A Constructive, Revisionist, Radical Agenda -- 1.3 Limitations and Responses to Initial Worries -- 1.4 The Way Ahead -- References -- 2 Kantian Moral Concern, Love, and Respect -- 2.1 What Is Moral Concern Kantian-Style? -- 2.2 Kant’s Taxonomy of Duties -- 2.3 Others’ Happiness as an Obligatory End -- 2.4 Practical Love and Respect for Others -- 2.5 Kant’s List of Duties Towards Others -- 2.6 Kant’s Restorative Project in Moral Philosophy -- References -- 3 The Case Against Kant’s ‘Indirect Duty’ Approach -- 3.1 Kant’s ‘Indirect’ Account of Duties Regarding Animals -- 3.2 Structural Problems of Kant’s Account -- 3.3 Substantive Shortcomings of Kant’s Account -- 3.4 The Unhelpfulness of Kant’s Account -- References -- Part II Building Kantianism for Animals -- 4 Is the Formula of Humanity the Problem? -- 4.1 Animals and the Formula of Humanity: Some Background -- 4.2 The Esteem-Concern Equivocation -- 4.3 Wood and Korsgaard Against the Esteem-Concern Equivocation -- 4.4 Obligatory Ends: How Kant Derives Duties to Others -- 4.5 What Is the Point of the Formula of Humanity, if Not Moral Concern? -- References -- 5 Animals and the ‘Directionality’ of Duties -- 5.1 Do We Truly ‘Share’ the Moral Law? Thompson’s Challenge to Kant -- 5.2 First-Personal Versus Second-Personal Accounts of ‘Directionality’ -- 5.3 Rejecting Thompson’s Challenge -- 5.4 Consent, Forgiveness, and Apologies Without Second-Personal Authority -- References -- 6 Kantian Moral Patients Without Practical Reason? -- 6.1 Duties of Respect Towards Moral Non-agents? -- 6.2 Adopting Another’s Ends as Our Own -- 6.3 Kant’s Denial of End-Directed Animal Agency -- 6.4 Animal ‘Ends’: Conceptual, Non-conceptual, ‘Obscure’ -- References -- 7 Kantianism for Animals: The Framework in Five Claims -- 7.1 Duties from Autonomy -- 7.2 The Primacy of Duties over Rights and Claims -- 7.3 Duties to Self and Others -- 7.4 Practical Love and Non-exaltation -- 7.5 Motives Matter -- References -- Part III Using the Framework -- 8 A Kantian Argument Against Using Animals -- 8.1 ‘External’ Arguments Against Using Animals -- 8.2 A Kantian-for-Animals ‘Internal’ Argument Against Animal Use -- References -- 9 A Kantian Argument Against Eating Animals -- 9.1 The Philosophical Stalemate Regarding Vegetarianism -- 9.2 A Kantian-for-Animals Argument Against Eating Animals -- References -- 10 A Kantian Argument Against Environmental Destruction -- 10.1 Kant and the Environment: Previous Approaches -- 10.2 A Kantian-for-Animals Perspective on the Environment -- References -- 11 Animal Ethics and the Philosophical Canon: A Proposal -- References -- Index.
This open access book revises Kant’s ethical thought in one of its most notorious respects: its exclusion of animals from moral consideration. The book gives readers in animal ethics an accessible introduction to Kant’s views on our duties to others, and his view that we have only ‘indirect’ duties regarding animals. It then investigates how one would have to depart from Kant in order to recognise that animals matter morally for their own sake. Particular attention is paid to Kant’s ‘Formula of Humanity,' the role of autonomy and the moral law, as well as Kant’s notions of practical reason and animal instinct. The result is a deliberately amended version of Kantianism which nevertheless remains faithful to central aspects of Kant’s thought. The book’s final part illustrates the framework’s use in applied contexts, addressing the issues of using animals as mere means, the ethics of veganism and vegetarianism, and environmental protection. Nico Dario Müller shows how, when furnished with duties to animals, Kant's moral philosophy can be a powerful resource for animal ethicists. Nico Dario Müller is a philosopher and postdoctoral researcher in ethics at the University of Basel, Switzerland.