Published in:American Accounting Association 2004 Mid-Atlantic Region Annual Meeting - Washington DC (Arlington VA)
Extent:
1 Online-Ressource (40 p)
Language:
English
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.488102
Identifier:
Origination:
Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments January 11, 2006 erstellt
Description:
Auditors face the challenging tasks of attesting that the financial statements are free from material misstatement while simultaneously fostering a functional working relationship with the client. As the financial statements may be considered, in part, a product of negotiations between the auditor and client management (Antle and Nalebuff 1991), the negotiation strategy employed by the auditor may be useful in effectively fulfilling both tasks. To investigate the effect of auditor strategy on the resolution of proposed audit adjustments in a post Sarbanes-Oxley environment, we conduct two experiments that examine both the client and auditor sides of the negotiation. We investigate a strategy of "concession" that draws upon the societal rule of reciprocation, which makes the waiving of inconsequential audit differences transparent. Specifically, with a concession approach, the auditor brings to the attention of the client all the audit differences (both significant and inconsequential) discovered during the audit and, subsequently, waives the inconsequential items. In contrast, a strategy of "no-concession" of inconsequential items (in which the auditor discloses to the client only the significant audit differences which must be booked) renders the client unaware of the waived inconsequential differences. Results from the first experiment indicate that, relative to a no-concession approach, participants representing client management (controllers/CFOs) are more willing to post significant income-decreasing adjustments when exposed to a concession approach in the course of negotiating the final contents of the audited financial statements. A concession approach also results in greater client satisfaction and retention. Consistent with these findings, results from the second experiment suggest that auditors also perceive that altering their approach toward greater disclosure of waived inconsequential audit differences can improve client satisfaction and retention