Published in:ZenTra Working Paper in Transnational Studies ; No. 31 / 2014
Extent:
1 Online-Ressource (24 p)
Language:
English
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.2387293
Identifier:
Origination:
Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 30, 2013 erstellt
Description:
In this paper, we analyze technology transfers (TT) and tradable emission rights, which are core is-sues of the ongoing climate negotiations. Subsidizing TT leads to the adoption of better abatement technologies in the South, thereby reducing the international permit price. This is beneficial for the North as long as it is a permit buyer; hence it chooses to subsidize TT. By contrast, the permit selling South suffers from the lower permit price and its welfare usually deteriorates, despite receiving subsidies. We also consider how TT affects countries’ non-cooperative choices of permit endowments and find that it tends to reduce overall emissions. Finally, a simple numerical simulation model illustrates the results and explores some further comparative statics