Footnote:
In: West European Politics 25 (1): 23-46, January 2002
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments 2002 erstellt
Description:
Why, how, and with what consequences do national governments delegate political authority to supranational institutions? Contrary to the static conceptions of delegation that dominate the existing literature, this article adopts a dynamic approach, where the stages of the delegation process are integrated into a coherent rational institutionalist framework. With demonstrations from the case of the European Union, I argue that: (1) the expected consequences of delegation motivate governments to confer certain functions to supranational institutions; (2) the nature of these functions influences the design of mechanisms for controlling the institutions; (3) the institutional design shapes the consequences of delegation by facilitating or obstructing attempts by the institutions to implement private agendas; and (4) the consequences of previous rounds of delegation affect future delegation, institutional design, and interaction, through positive and negative feed-back loops