• Media type: E-Book
  • Title: Voting Blocs, Party Discipline and Party Formation
  • Contributor: Eguia, Jon X. [Author]
  • Published: [S.l.]: SSRN, 2010
  • Extent: 1 Online-Ressource (48 p)
  • Language: English
  • DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1514506
  • Identifier:
  • Origination:
  • Footnote: Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments February 11, 2010 erstellt
  • Description: In this paper I study the strategic implications of coalition formation in an assembly. A coalition forms a voting bloc to coordinate the voting behavior of its members, acting as a single player and affecting the policy outcome. In a game of endogenous coalition formation, I show that voting blocs form in equilibrium, and in an assembly with two parties I show how the incentives to join a bloc depend on the types of the agents, the sizes of the parties, and the rules the blocs use to aggregate preferences
  • Access State: Open Access