Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 7, 2009 erstellt
Description:
The debate on the effects of high skilled migration (Brain Drain) has recently intensified. Actually, the BD literature is not adequate to explain the European Brain where there are not strong differences between sending and receiving country and there is a bi-directional BD. To cover this lack in the literature, we propose a simple model which helps us to analyze the BD mechanisms between symmetric countries. In this paper we analyze the impact of BD on redistributive policies and the provision of education as a publicly provided good. Differently of the main BD literature, this analysis is adequate to simulate the new European framework, where mobility of European citizens is free of institutional constraints and where Fiscal treatments must be identical for all the European citizens of the same region. In these contests study of the BD linked with the Fiscal Competition (FC) and the choice of education for both workers and/or by governments. Potential mobility of educated workers can increase the degree of FC through taxation or the provision of public education. An increase in FC can be caused by competition among different jurisdictions that aim to attract educated workers. When the importance of FC increases, then the States may employ FC as a new policy tool. The contribution of this study is to emphasize the increase of effciency loss caused by the two negative effects due to the absence of coordination among jurisdictions: less redistribution and less provision of education as a publicly provided good