Published in:CIRANO - Scientific Publications ; No. 2007s-03
Extent:
1 Online-Ressource (30 p)
Language:
English
DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.1093309
Identifier:
Origination:
Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments February 1, 2007 erstellt
Description:
We offer a definition of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS) for games with (in)finite players, (non)compact strategy sets, and (dis)continuous payoff functions. IESDS is always a well-defined order independent procedure that can be used to solve Nash equilibrium in dominance-solvable games. We characterize IESDS by means of a "stability" criterion, and offer a sufficient and necessary epistemic condition for IESDS. We show by an example that IESDS may generate spurious Nash equilibria in the class of Reny's better-reply secure games. We provide sufficient/necessary conditions under which IESDS preserves the set of Nash equilibria