Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 10, 2022 erstellt
Description:
We examine the impact on corporate cash holdings of international merger and acquisition (M&A) laws, which facilitate corporate takeovers. We use the staggered enactment of M&A laws from 1992 to 2005 and a sample spanning 34 jurisdictions, and find that levels of corporate cash holdings increase after passage of M&A laws. We also find that firms with better operating performance, higher earnings volatility, higher P/E ratio, and in jurisdictions with high M&A intensity hoard more cash after enactment of M&A laws. These firms decrease dividends and capital expenditure and increase cash-based acquisitions in the post-M&A law period. Additional analysis shows that the effect is manifested in the subsample of firms in jurisdictions with better institutional environments. Lastly, we find that investor valuations of cash holdings decrease after enactment of M&A laws. Collectively, our results suggest that managers hoard cash to finance M&A activities after the enactment of M&A laws, driven by the motive of empire-building, and that cash hoarding behaviors are viewed by investors as value-decreasing