Footnote:
Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments January 12, 2023 erstellt
Description:
This article explores the many ways that entry is relevant to horizontal merger analysis.Only one, however, is part of the current canon, and it is handled incorrectly. The analysisdraws on work in industrial organization economics that examines entry in imperfectlycompetitive markets. Ex post entry—postmerger entry induced by a merger’s anticompetitiveeffects—is cast in a different light concerning when and how much entry will take place, thewelfare effects of such entry when it does occur, and the implications of postmerger entry forunderstanding what motivates proposed mergers and thus their likely effects. Ex anteentry—entry induced by the prospect of a subsequent acquisition—is brought into the spotlight.This consideration favors more stringent merger policy in some settings and more permissivereview in others. Recent attention, especially in Big Tech, to incumbents’ acquisitions ofnascent competitors often improperly takes entrants’ presence and capabilities as given.Analysis should also consider how a merger regime influences ex ante incentives that determinethe future flow of such competitive opportunities, although this factor need not favor permissivetreatment of such mergers