• Media type: E-Book
  • Title: Patient versus provider incentives in long-term care
  • Contributor: Hackmann, Martin B. [VerfasserIn]; Pohl, R. Vincent [VerfasserIn]; Ziebarth, Nicolas R. [VerfasserIn]
  • imprint: Bonn, Germany: IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, May 2023
  • Published in: Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit: Discussion paper series ; 16165
  • Extent: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 93 Seiten); Illustrationen
  • Language: English
  • Identifier:
  • Keywords: long-term care ; nursing homes ; patient incentives ; provider incentives ; cost-sharing ; episode-based reimbursement ; Medicaid ; Graue Literatur
  • Origination:
  • Footnote:
  • Description: How do patient and provider incentives affect the provision of long-term care? Our analysis of 551 thousand nursing home stays yields three main insights. First, Medicaid-covered residents prolong their stays instead of transitioning to community-based care due to limited cost-sharing. Second, when facility capacity binds, nursing homes shorten Medicaid stays to admit more profitable out-of-pocket private payers. Third, providers react more elastically to financial incentives than patients. Thus, targeting provider incentives through alternative payment models, such as episode-based reimbursement, is more effective than increasing patient cost-sharing in facilitating transitions to community-based care and generating long-term care savings.
  • Access State: Open Access