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Garbinti, Bertrand [Author]; Goupille-Lebret, Jonathan [Author]; Muñoz, Mathilde [Author]; Stantcheva, Stefanie [Author]; Zucman, Gabriel [Author] ; National Bureau of Economic Research

Tax Design, Information, and Elasticities

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  • Media type: E-Book
  • Title: Tax Design, Information, and Elasticities : Evidence From the French Wealth Tax
  • Contributor: Garbinti, Bertrand [VerfasserIn]; Goupille-Lebret, Jonathan [VerfasserIn]; Muñoz, Mathilde [VerfasserIn]; Stantcheva, Stefanie [VerfasserIn]; Zucman, Gabriel [VerfasserIn]
  • Corporation: National Bureau of Economic Research
  • imprint: Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, June 2023
  • Published in: NBER working paper series ; no. w31333
  • Extent: 1 Online-Ressource; illustrations (black and white)
  • Language: English
  • Keywords: Vermögensteuer ; Elastizität ; Steuerreform ; Steuerwirkung ; Steuervermeidung ; Frankreich ; Tax Evasion and Avoidance ; Household ; Arbeitspapier ; Graue Literatur
  • Reproduction note: Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
  • Origination:
  • Footnote:
  • Description: We study a French wealth tax reform that starkly reduced the information some taxpayers must report to the tax authority. Using a new dynamic bunching approach we estimate the average response to the reform, the share of compliers, and the local average treatment effect. The annual wealth growth rate of treated taxpayers falls by 0.5 percentage points after the reform. This decline is likely due to increased evasion, as suggested by the sharp responses in self-reported wealth but not in third-party-reported incomes. The wealth tax base becomes more elastic post reform, illustrating the key role of information policy choices for tax base elasticities