• Media type: E-Book
  • Title: Comparing the Effects of Non-Monetary Incentives and Monetary
  • Contributor: Asulin, Yamit [VerfasserIn]; Heller, Yuval [VerfasserIn]; Munichor, Nira [VerfasserIn]
  • imprint: [S.l.]: SSRN, [2023]
  • Extent: 1 Online-Ressource (23 p)
  • Language: English
  • DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4427259
  • Identifier:
  • Keywords: Prosocial behavior ; Crowding out ; Field experiments ; Non-monetary incentives ; Monetary incentives ; Real-effort experiment
  • Origination:
  • Footnote:
  • Description: Multiple studies suggest that, contrary to economic rationale, offering monetary incentives to complete a task can negatively affect task performance. This phenomenon is attributed to so-called crowding-out effects, in which monetary rewards “crowd out” non-monetary sources of value that people derive from task completion (e.g., intrinsic value of the task; social recognition). Yet, recent work calls the validity of crowding-out effects into question. In this study, we revisit a well-known field experiment by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) that provides evidence for crowding-out effects in the context of prosocial behavior. We test the robustness of these effects using a larger sample and adjust the experiment’s design to better elucidate the role of non-monetary incentives in prosocial behavior. Specifically, we give 245 pairs of high school students different incentives to collect donations for charity: lowmonetary incentives (1% of the total donations collected), high monetary incentives (10% of the total donations collected), non-monetary incentives (a better sense of the task’s importance and public recognition), or no external incentives. In line with crowding-out effects and Gneezy and Rustichini's (2000) findings, our results show that low monetary incentives elicit lower performance (collected donations) compared with the absence of external incentives. Importantly, non-monetary incentives elicit higher performancecompared with either monetary incentive or the absence of external incentives
  • Access State: Open Access