Description:
With the deterioration of the climate and the depletion of traditional energy sources, green innovative technology sharing has become a hot topic of concern for countries. Based on this, considering the competition among manufacturers, this paper constructs two game models for green technology sharing, conducted separately by an advanced manufacturer and a third party. It explores the technology-sharing strategies and mode selection issues for each entity, analyzes the effect of the introducing party's absorptive capacity and the horizontal differentiation of products on equilibrium strategies, and provides numerical examples. The results indicate that: (1) Under certain sharing conditions, the advanced manufacturer and the third party are willing to share green innovative technology. The introducing party always benefits from the technology sharing by the advanced manufacturer, while third-party sharing imposes higher requirements on the introducing party's own technology and product differentiation. Therefore, the introducing party is more inclined to introduce green technology from the advanced manufacturer. (2) The absorptive capacity and horizontal differentiation between products have a significant impact on the willingness of each entity to share: as absorptive capacity improves, the willingness of the third party to share technology increases while the willingness of advanced manufacturer decreases; as the horizontal differentiation between products increases, the willingness of both sharing parties to share strengthens. (3) Green innovative technology sharing can improve consumer surplus under certain conditions, depending on the size of sharing fee and horizontal differentiation between products