Description:
We investigate whether the presence of fiscal rules might limit the insurgence of a Political Budget Cycle (PBC) in investment spending at municipal level. Data based on the balance sheets of Italian municipalities are explored for the period 1999-2012. In line with some existing studies, we investigate the effect of the Domestic Stability Pact (DSP) and rely on the fact that, since 2001, this tax rule has not been binding for municipalities with under 5,000 inhabitants. Our main contribution consists of exploiting this quasi-experimental setting by means of a difference-in-discontinuities (Diff-in-Disc) estimation strategy in order to obtain unbiased estimates. In comparison with the already existing results, our study makes three observations. First, that the easing of fiscal rules only generates an increase in capital expenditure in the year immediately before elections. Second, that this increase only arises for those investments which produce immediately-visible effects. Finally, the size of the electoral cycle shows a 100 percent increase in these investments which is almost three times larger than that reported in the literature