• Media type: E-Book
  • Title: Uniform-price auctions with adjustable supply
  • Contributor: McAdams, David [Author]
  • Published: Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Sloan School of Management, 2006
  • Published in: Alfred P. Sloan School of Management: Sloan working papers ; 4618
  • Extent: Online-Ressource (31 S., 301 KB); graph. Darst
  • Language: English
  • DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.925276
  • Identifier:
  • Keywords: Spezialkleidung ; Preis ; Auktion ; Arbeitspapier ; Graue Literatur
  • Origination:
  • Footnote:
  • Description: In the uniform-price auction with adjustable supply, the seller decides how much to sell after receiving the bids so as to maximize its ex post profit. Given N bidders and adjustable supply, all equilibria of the uniform-price auction lead to price on order 1/N3 below the Walrasian price. By contrast, given the usual market-clearing rule it is well-known that the uniform-price auction can lead to equilibrium prices on order 1/N below the Walrasian price
  • Access State: Open Access