• Media type: E-Book
  • Title: Indirect incentives of hedge fund managers
  • Contributor: Lim, Jongha [Author]; Sensoy, Berk A. [Author]; Weisbach, Michael S. [Author]
  • Published: Columbus, Ohio: Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics, 2013
  • Published in: Ohio State University: Fisher College of Business working paper series ; 2013,0600
    Ohio State University: Fisher College of Business working paper series ; 2013000600
  • Extent: Online-Ressource (44 S.)
  • Language: English
  • DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2233514
  • Identifier:
  • Keywords: 1995-2010 ; Hedgefonds ; Führungskräfte ; Leistungsanreiz ; Leistungsentgelt ; Welt ; Arbeitspapier ; Graue Literatur
  • Origination:
  • Footnote: Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
  • Description: Indirect incentives exist in the money management industry when good current performance increases future inflows of capital, leading to higher future fees. For the average hedge fund, indirect incentives are at least 1.4 times as large as direct incentives from incentive fees and managers' personal stakes in the fund. Combining direct and indirect incentives, manager wealth increases by at least $0.39 for a $1 increase in investor wealth. Younger and more scalable hedge funds have stronger flow-performance relations, leading to stronger indirect incentives. These results have a number of implications for ourunderstanding of incentives in the asset management industry
  • Access State: Open Access