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Media type:
E-Article
Title:
Proof, Semiotics, and the Computer: On the Relevance and Limitation of Thought Experiment in Mathematics
Contributor:
Lenhard, Johannes
[Author]
imprint:
KLUEDO - Publication Server of University of Kaiserslautern-Landau (RPTU), 2022
Language:
English
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-022-09626-2
Origination:
Footnote:
Diese Datenquelle enthält auch Bestandsnachweise, die nicht zu einem Volltext führen.
Description:
This contribution defends two claims. The first is about why thought experiments are so relevant and powerful in mathematics. Heuristics and proof are not strictly and, therefore, the relevance of thought experiments is not contained to heuristics. The main argument is based on a semiotic analysis of how mathematics works with signs. Seen in this way, formal symbols do not eliminate thought experiments (replacing them by something rigorous), but rather provide a new stage for them. The formal world resembles the empirical world in that it calls for exploration and offers surprises. This presents a major reason why thought experiments occur both in empirical sciences and in mathematics. The second claim is about a looming aporia that signals the limitation of thought experiments. This aporia arises when mathematical arguments cease to be fully accessible, thus violating a precondition for experimenting in thought. The contribution focuses on the work of Vladimir Voevodsky (1966–2017, Fields medalist in 2002) who argued that even very pure branches of mathematics cannot avoid inaccessibility of proof. Furthermore, he suggested that computer verification is a feasible path forward, but only if proof is not modeled in terms of formal logic.