• Media type: E-Article; Text
  • Title: Effects of patent privateering on settlements and R&D under sequential market entry
  • Contributor: Klapper, Felix B. [Author]; Siemering, Christian [Author]
  • imprint: Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 2024
  • Published in: Information Economics and Policy 66 (2024) ; Information Economics and Policy
  • Issue: published Version
  • Language: English
  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.15488/16740; https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2024.101080
  • ISSN: 0167-6245
  • Keywords: Intellectual property rights ; Patent licensing ; Patent assertion entities ; Sequential entry ; Innovation ; R&D
  • Origination:
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  • Description: We investigate patent litigation, settlements and R&D incentives on a market where two firms develop technologies in order to obtain patents and produce goods. Firms may sell IP rights to a Patent Assertion Entity (PAE) that acts as intermediary for patent monetization. We find that compared to simultaneous market entry, the effect of this so-called patent privateering is mitigated if firms enter sequentially. Furthermore, we show that privateering may decrease industry profits by distortion of R&D incentives even when there is no rent extraction by the PAE.
  • Access State: Open Access