• Media type: Report; E-Book
  • Title: On Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring: From Discrete to Continuous Time
  • Contributor: Staudigl, Mathias [Author]; Steg, Jan-Henrik [Author]
  • Published: Bielefeld: Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), 2014
  • Language: English
  • Keywords: continuous-time game theory ; weak convergence ; stochastic optimal control
  • Origination:
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  • Description: Motivated by recent path-breaking contributions in the theory of repeated games in continuous time, this paper presents a family of discrete-time games which provides a consistent discrete-time approximation of the continuous-time limit game. Using probabilistic arguments, we prove that continuous-time games can be defined as the limit of a sequence of discrete-time games. Our convergence analysis reveals various intricacies of continuous-time games. First, we demonstrate the importance of correlated strategies in continuous-time. Second, we attach a precise meaning to the statement that a sequence of discrete-time games can be used to approximate a continuous-time game.
  • Access State: Open Access