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Media type:
Report;
E-Book
Title:
Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games
Contributor:
Swinkels, Jeroen M.
[Author]
Published:
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, 1991
Footnote:
Diese Datenquelle enthält auch Bestandsnachweise, die nicht zu einem Volltext führen.
Description:
When a strategic situation arises repeatedly, the possibility arises that equilibrium predictions can be justified by a dynamic adjustment process. We examine myopic adjustment dynamics, a class that includes replicator dynamics from evolutionary game theory, simple models of imitation, models of experimentation and adjustment, and some simple learning dynamics. We present a series of theorems showing conditions under which behavior that is asymptotically stable under some such dynamic is strategically stable (Kohlberg and Mertens [1986]). This behavior is thus as if the agents in the economy satisfied the extremely stringent assumptions that game theory traditionally makes about rationality and beliefs.