• Media type: Text; E-Article; Electronic Conference Proceeding
  • Title: Divide-and-Conquer: A Proportional, Minimal-Envy Cake-Cutting Procedure
  • Contributor: Brams, Steven J. [Author]; Jones, Michael A. [Author]; Klamler, Christian [Author]
  • Published: Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2007
  • Language: English
  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.4230/DagSemProc.07261.6
  • Keywords: proportionality ; Cake-cutting ; envy-freeness ; efficiency ; strategy-proofness
  • Origination:
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  • Description: Properties of discrete cake-cutting procedures that use a minimal number of cuts (n-1 if there are n players) are analyzed. None is always envy-free or efficient, but divide-and-conquer (D&C) minimizes the maximum number of players that any single player may envy. It works by asking n ≥ 2 players successively to place marks on a cake that divide it into equal or approximately equal halves, then halves of these halves, and so on. Among other properties, D&C (i) ensures players of more than 1/n shares if their marks are different and (ii) is strategyproof for risk-averse players. However, D&C may not allow players to obtain proportional, connected pieces if they have unequal entitlements. Possible applications of D&C to land division are briefly discussed.
  • Access State: Open Access