imprint:
Washington, D.C: The World Bank, 2013
2013
Extent:
Online-Ressource (46 p)
Language:
English
DOI:
10.1596/1813-9450-6521
Identifier:
Reproductino series:
World Bank eLibrary
Origination:
Footnote:
Description:
This paper studies the role of cooperation and reciprocity on the structure of self-enforcing carbon sequestration contracts. The optimal contract is derived as a result of the optimizing actions of purely self-interested agents, and agents that act according to social or egoistic preferences. The analysis finds that buyers' preferences do not affect contract structure unless the buyer is averse to inequality. In contrast, the optimal payment rule is directly related to the seller's preferences as the payment must motivate the seller to comply with forest conservation. It also finds that the presence of altruistic or warm glow preferences increases the likelihood of cooperation in the long-term relationship relative to the case of selfish parties. These results imply that agencies or organizations that are not only concerned about carbon sequestration but also have objectives related to the economic development of small land holders may be more successful in the implementation contracts to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation