imprint:
Washington, D.C: The World Bank, 2013
2013
Extent:
Online-Ressource (38 p)
Language:
English
DOI:
10.1596/1813-9450-6653
Identifier:
Reproductino series:
World Bank eLibrary
Origination:
Footnote:
Description:
Vote-buying is pervasive, but not everywhere. What explains significant variations across countries in the greater use of pre-electoral transfers to mobilize voters relative to the use of pre-electoral promises of post-electoral transfers? This paper explicitly models the trade-offs that politicians incur when they decide between mobilizing support with vote-buying or promises of post-electoral benefits. Politicians rely more on vote-buying when they are less credible, target vote-buying to those who do not believe their political promises, and only buy votes from those who would have received post-electoral transfers in a world of full political credibility. The enforcement of a prohibition on vote-buying reduces the welfare of those targeted with vote-buying, but improves the welfare of all other groups in society