You can manage bookmarks using lists, please log in to your user account for this.
Media type:
E-Article
Title:
Threatening the Unthinkable: Strategic Stability and the Credibility of North Korea's Nuclear Threats
Contributor:
Kodama, Nick
Published:
Oxford University Press (OUP), 2021
Published in:
Journal of Global Security Studies, 6 (2021) 1
Language:
English
DOI:
10.1093/jogss/ogaa004
ISSN:
2057-3170;
2057-3189
Origination:
Footnote:
Description:
AbstractWith the spread of nuclear weapons to regional actors facing adversaries with superior conventional and nuclear forces, the prospect of deliberate nuclear first use is no longer unthinkable. This is especially the case with North Korea, which not only faces strong incentives for first use in a crisis but also has made the threat of first use a key component of its nuclear posture. To analyze the emerging US-DPRK deterrence relationship, this article presents a framework for outlining North Korea's calculus of when first use is rational, and examines the interaction between North Korea's threshold for first use and the United States’ perception of that threshold. By conceptualizing this interaction with four ideal-typical dyads, this article argues that the most stable dyad is one in which the United States recognizes that North Korea has the capability and willingness to use nuclear weapons at low crisis thresholds.