Description:
AbstractSome Presentists—according to whom everything is present—identify instants of time with propositions of a certain kind. However, the view that times are propositions seems to be at odds with Presentism: if there are times then there are past times, and therefore things that are past; but how could there be things that are past if everything is present? In this paper, we describe the Presentist view that times are propositions (Sect. 2); we set out the argument that Presentism is incompatible with the view that times are propositions (Sect. 3); and then we describe three possible responses to that argument on behalf of Presentists who identify times with propositions (Sect. 4). We argue that each of these responses comes with significant costs. Finally, we describe a fourth possible response—according to which times are irreducibly higher-order entities—which appears to avoid the costs of the other three (Sect. 5). We also describe and respond to two objections to the higher-order strategy (Sect. 6).