You can manage bookmarks using lists, please log in to your user account for this.
Media type:
E-Article
Title:
A timing game in a mixed duopoly
Contributor:
Sun, Chia-Hung
Published:
Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2024
Published in:
SERIEs, 15 (2024) 1, Seite 127-144
Language:
English
DOI:
10.1007/s13209-023-00285-z
ISSN:
1869-4195;
1869-4187
Origination:
Footnote:
Description:
AbstractThis paper investigates a timing game in a mixed duopoly, whereby a relatively inefficient state-owned firm maximizing the linear combination of its profit and social welfare competes against a relatively efficient, profit-maximizing private firm over the timing of entry. We find that the incentives for firms to enter the market depend on the degrees of privatization of a state-owned firm and of the cost asymmetry between the two firms. We also provide welfare analysis by comparing the equilibrium timing of entry with the socially optimal one. When the two firms’ products are perfect substitutes, the socially optimal timing of both firms entering the market can be achieved if the state-owned firm is fully public.