• Media type: E-Article
  • Title: Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation
  • Contributor: SVOLIK, MILAN
  • imprint: Cambridge University Press (CUP), 2008
  • Published in: American Political Science Review
  • Language: English
  • DOI: 10.1017/s0003055408080143
  • ISSN: 0003-0554; 1537-5943
  • Origination:
  • Footnote:
  • Description: <jats:p>I present a new empirical approach to the study of democratic consolidation. This approach leads to new insights into the determinants of democratic consolidation that cannot be obtained with existing techniques. I distinguish between democracies that survive because they are<jats:italic>consolidated</jats:italic>and those democracies that are<jats:italic>not consolidated</jats:italic>but survive because of some favorable circumstances. As a result, I can identify the determinants of two related yet distinct processes: the likelihood that a democracy consolidates, and the timing of authoritarian reversals in democracies that are not consolidated. I find that the level of economic development, type of democratic executive, and type of authoritarian past determine whether a democracy consolidates, but have no effect on the timing of reversals in democracies that are not consolidated. That risk is only associated with economic recessions. I also find that existing studies greatly underestimate the risk of early reversals while simultaneously overestimating the risk of late reversals, and that a large number of existing democracies are in fact consolidated.</jats:p>