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Media type:
E-Article
Title:
Reframing the Guardianship Dilemma: How the Military’s Dual Disloyalty Options Imperil Dictators
Contributor:
PAINE, JACK
Published:
Cambridge University Press (CUP), 2022
Published in:
American Political Science Review, 116 (2022) 4, Seite 1425-1442
Language:
English
DOI:
10.1017/s0003055422000089
ISSN:
0003-0554;
1537-5943
Origination:
Footnote:
Description:
<jats:p>Dictators confront a guardianship dilemma: military agents are needed to defeat mass outsider movements, but these agents can overthrow the ruler from within. In existing theories, rulers prioritize coup-proofing measures unless they anticipate strong outsider threats. Then dictators prioritize military competence. I reframe the guardianship dilemma around the central idea that militaries can choose between dual disloyalty options. In addition to staging a coup, militaries can defect by not fending off popular uprisings or rebellions. Dictators fear competent militaries not primarily because of their coup threat but instead because they often survive intact following a regime transition. Low motivation for competent militaries to save the ruler undermines their rationale of guarding against outsider threats, even if they pose a low coup threat. Consequently, rulers prioritize competence under narrow circumstances. Only radically oriented outsider movements that pose an existential threat to all regime elites induce loyalty from a competent military.</jats:p>