• Media type: E-Article
  • Title: Does functionalism really deal with the phenomenal side of experience?
  • Contributor: Manzotti, Riccardo; Sandini, Giulio
  • Published: Cambridge University Press (CUP), 2001
  • Published in: Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24 (2001) 5, Seite 993-994
  • Language: English
  • DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x01450114
  • ISSN: 0140-525X; 1469-1825
  • Origination:
  • Footnote:
  • Description: Sensory motor contingencies belong to a functionalistic framework. Functionalism does not explain why and how objective functional relations produce phenomenal experience. O'Regan & Noë (O&N) as well as other functionalists do not propose a new ontology that could support the first person subjective phenomenal side of experience.