Description:
<jats:p>The most important clarification we bring in our reply to commentators concerns the problem of the “explanatory gap”: that is, the gulf that separates physical processes in the brain from the experienced quality of sensations. By adding two concepts (bodiliness and grabbiness) that were not stressed in the target article, we strengthen our claim and clarify why we think we have solved the explanatory gap problem, – not by <jats:italic>dismissing</jats:italic> qualia, but, on the contrary, by <jats:italic>explaining</jats:italic> why sensations have a “feel” and why “feels” feel the way they do. We additionally clarify our views on: internal representations (we claim internal representations cannot explain why sensation has a feel), on behaviorism (we are <jats:italic>not</jats:italic> behaviorists), on perception and action (we believe there <jats:italic>can</jats:italic> be perception without action), and on the brain (we believe the brain <jats:italic>does</jats:italic> do something important in perception).</jats:p>