Description:
<jats:p>People construct self-representation beyond the experiential self and the self-concept can expand to interpersonal as well as intrapersonal dimensions. The cognitive ability to project oneself onto expanded selves in different time points and places plays a crucial role in planning and decision-making situations. However, no research to date has shown evidence explaining the early mechanism of how processing the experiential self-information differs from processing the expanded self-information across temporal, social, spatial, and probability domains. We report novel effects showing a systematic information prioritization toward the experiential selves (i.e., the self that is now, here, and with highest certainty) compared to the expanded selves (i.e., the self that is in the future, at a distant location, and with lower certainty; Experiments 1a, 2, and 3). Implicit prioritization biases lasted over time (Experiment 1b; i.e., 4 months) indicating a trait-like more than a state-like measure of individual differences. Different biases, however, did not consistently correlate with each other (Experiments 1a to 3) suggesting separate underlying mechanisms. We discuss potential links to the basic structure of self-representation and individual differences for implications.</jats:p>