Description:
<jats:p>Subjects participated in a three‐person negotiation exercise, in which they had to form two‐ or three‐way coalitions to receive resources. The effects of power position (high, medium, low), distribution norms (contribution, need), and task meeting structure (caucus, joint) on the distribution of resources were examined. Most coalition theories assume that the power position of the players calls into play different levels of entitlement which will determine the allocation of resources. There has, however, been little attempt to manipulate entitlement, in the form of distribution norms, separately from power structure. In the research reported here, three‐person groups contained a high, medium, and low power player. The dominant group distribution norm was manipulated as either contribution‐based or need‐based. Task meeting structure was manipulated by beginning each group meeting with either a three‐way meeting between all players (joint) or a series of one‐on‐one meetings (caucus). As predicted, groups that began by caucusing had a higher incidence of two‐way agreements than groups that began with joint meetings. The task meeting structure interacted with power position such that caucusing increased the high power player's outcome, while the joint meeting structure increased the low power player's outcome. In addition, the distribution norm interacted with power position such that the contribution‐based norm increased the outcomes of high power players, while the need‐based norm increased the outcomes of the low power players.</jats:p>