• Media type: E-Article
  • Title: The Language of Practical Philosophy
  • Contributor: Weinberger, Ota
  • imprint: Wiley, 2002
  • Published in: Ratio Juris
  • Language: English
  • DOI: 10.1111/1467-9337.00209
  • ISSN: 0952-1917; 1467-9337
  • Keywords: Law
  • Origination:
  • Footnote:
  • Description: <jats:p>Kant’s criticism is based on the idea that all possible knowledge of facts is determined by the immanent structure of our apparatus of cognition, and that therefore we have no access to reality as it is <jats:italic>per se</jats:italic> (“<jats:italic>Ding an sich</jats:italic>”). In modern analytical philosophy some elements of this view survived, namely, the distinction between framework construction and actual data of experience, supposition or voluntary setting. The <jats:italic>conditio humana</jats:italic> is characterised by our capacity of acting. Acting is defined as behaviour determined and controlled by information processes. The structure of these processes defines the semantics and logical principles of practical philosophy. From this view follows the conception of value judgments, the logic of preferences, formal teleology, the analysis of utility and norm logic. The framework theories should be open in order to be able to express all possible theoretical views, namely, subjectivism as well as objectivism. The paper gives a concise account of the systems of practical thought (formal axiology, formal teleology, preference logic and norm logic) and their gnoseological problems.</jats:p>